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EXPLORING THE FAR REACHES OF THE
STATE ACTION EXEMPTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM
ERIC L. RICHARDS*

The state action exemption is an attempt to balance the national interest in antitrust enforcement with the sovereign authority of the states.1 This clash between the states and the national
government was not envisioned by the authors of the antitrust
laws. Passage of the Sherman Act (the Act)2 in 1890 was accompanied by few strains on our federal system, for at the time it was
believed that Congress did not have the power to regulate state
economic activity. 3 The Supreme Court, however, decided that
A.B., Indiana University, 1974; J.D., Indiana University, 1976.
Since the passage of the Sherman Act (the Act) in 1890, various groups have sought to
be exempt from its provisions. Comment, State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Parker
Doctrine's Application to Municipalities, 8 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 513, 514 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Parker Doctrine Comment]. Both Congress and the federal judiciary have been
sources of antitrust exemptions. Id. Perhaps the most troublesome of the judicially created
exemptions is that accorded the activities of the states. Although creation of the state action
exemption is attributed to the Supreme Court case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
see infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text, the underpinnings of the doctrine can be
traced to two earlier cases, Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895), and Olsen v.
Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
Lowenstein addressed whether a South Carolina statute granting the state a monopoly
in the liquor trade violated the Sherman Act. 69 F. at 910. The court found that the state's
total control of the liquor industry fell outside the ambit of activities prohibited by the Act,
since a state was neither a "corporation" nor a "person" for antitrust purposes. Id. at 911.
In Olsen, the Supreme Court sustained a Texas law regulating pilotage, holding that a
state's exercise of its power to regulate did not implicate the antitrust laws. 195 U.S. at 34445; see Comment, State Action and the Sherman Antitrust Act: Should the Antitrust Laws
Be Given a Preemptive Effect?, 14 CONN. L. REv. 135, 137-38 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Sherman Antitrust Act Comment]; Comment, Antitrust Immunity: State Action Protection Under Parker v. Brown, 7 U.S.F.L. Rav. 453, 455-56 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Immunity Comment].
I Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). The Supreme Court has stated
that the purpose of the Sherman Act is "to use [constitutional] power to make ... . so far
as Congress could under our dual system, a competitive business economy." United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559 (1944) (footnote omitted).
3 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605-06 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
see Page, Antitrust Federalismand the Regulatory Process:A Reconstructionand Critique
*
1
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Congress intended to broaden the scope of the Act to parallel the
expanding ambit of the commerce power." Thus, by virtue of the
enlarged post-1890 jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, the
state action exemption has become increasingly significant.5
Manifestations of the conflict between the national policy
favoring competition and local regulatory power are particularly
acute in light of the country's current states' rights mood.6 Moreover, there is no easy escape from this dilemma since the Court,
obligated under the supremacy clause7 to uphold the Sherman Act,
of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1099, 1104-07
(1981). Originally, it was believed that the commerce clause did not accord Congress the
power to regulate the economic activity of the states, see Page, supra, at 1104-07. This
narrow view of the commerce clause has been attributed to the fact that "Congress probably
never actually considered whether state action was to be included within the coverage of the
act." Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U.L. REV.71, 84 (1974).
4 See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976). Initially, the commerce clause was expanded through eliminating the distinction between intrastate and interstate activities. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 233-35 (1948). This inquiry eventually extended Congress' power under
the commerce clause "beyond the flow of commerce to all activities having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02
(1974). The scope of the Sherman Act paralleled the expanding scope of the commerce
clause so that "however local its immediate object, a 'contract, combination ... or conspiracy' nonetheless may constitute a restraint within the meaning of [the Act] if it substantially and adversely affects interstate commerce." Id. at 194-95.
' See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 637 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
see Richards, Reconciling the Tension Between Anticompetitive State Regulations and the
Sherman Act: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 19 AM. Bus.
L.J. 539, 541-42 (1932).
6 The recent state of federalism has been described as a relationship where "the federal
government... [has] all the money, the states [have] the police power, and the local governments [have] all the problems." Freilich, Cox & Hall, 1980-1981 Annual Review of Local
Government Law: The ChangingFederal Direction and its Impact on Local Government,
13 URB. LAW. 621, 623-24 (1981). The panacea for this apparent inequity is believed to be
decreased federal influence in state decisionmaking. See Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694, 1712-14 (1981).
More specifically, "a requirement that states make decisions on matters within the realm of
exclusive state power uninfluenced by ... [federal political pressure] is necessary ... to

carry out the constitutional system of allocating power and to achieve the goals of Federalism." Id. at 1713. In addition, this movement of returning power to the states is justified by
the notion that local governments more accurately reflect the sensibility and needs of the
popular electorate. C. BARFIELD, RErrHINKING FEnERALSM 49 (1981). It is argued that "the
closer a unit of government is to the people it serves, the more likely it will be to implement
policy goals they desire." Note, supra, at 1700. When decisionmaking is made in smaller
units, more direct public participation is possible. Kaden, Politics,Money and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 853 (1979).
7The supremacy clause provides: "[T]he laws of the United States . .. shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
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has also played a considerable role in nurturing a diverse and pluralistic network of state and local governments." As a result, the
state action exemption, as a balancing device, clearly has broad implications for the eventual composition of the federal system. Further, judicial reconciliation of the tension between the Sherman
Act and state sovereignty often has left the courts open to charges
of unduly interfering with the legislative prerogative of the states."°
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl.2.
8 Richards, supra note 5, at 539-42; see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 623 & n.6 (1975).
The Supreme Court's recent attempt "to return legislative power and prerogatives to the
states in order to preserve the nation's dual system of state and federal sovereignty," Richards, supra note 5, at 539, is limited severely by its obligation to "uphold the congressional
commitment to antitrust," id. at 542. For a recent attempt by the Supreme Court to resolve
this dilemma, see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1981); Comment, California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.:
Federal Power Under the Twenty First Amendment?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 302, 305
(1981). In Midcal, the Court concluded that the federal interest in interstate commerce will
override a conflicting state interest in alcohol regulation only in "appropriate situations."
445 U.S. at 110; see infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text. The determination of an
appropriate situation would be made after recognizing the burden a state regulation imposes
upon interstate commerce and weighing the state's interest in imposing that regulation
against the federal interest in interstate commerce. Id. at 110-11. It has been suggested that
this balancing test should be done on a case-by-case basis. See Note, The Effect of the
Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1578, 1594 (1975).
' The following has been proffered as a definition of the federal system:
A type of polity operating a Constitution which works on two levels of government: as a nation and as a collection of related but self-standing units .... It
seeks on the one hand to create and maintain a nation, on the other to preserve
the integrity of the units, their identity, culture and tradition. The objective of
building and maintaining a nation implies that there needs to be unity of commercial and financial policy, and free movement of labour and capital from one part
to another. But neither level of government can be allowed absolute sovereignty,
because this would violate some of the rights of the other level, which are guaranteed in the Constitution.
U. HICKs, FEDERALISM: FAmURE AND SuccEss 4 (1978).
10 See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 630-31 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); infra note 87 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart, dissenting in 'Cantor,criticized
the majority's interpretation of the Sherman Act by claiming that such an interpretation
would allow the federal judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of state legislators. Id.
at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The purported state legislative judgment was made by the
State of Michigan's Public Service Commission when it permitted a Detroit supplier of electricity to distribute light bulbs to its customers at no separate charge. 428 U.S. at 582-83.
Reasoning that "[tihe lamp supply program ... [was] by no means imperative in the continued effective functioning of Michigan's regulation of the utilities industry," id. at 597
n.36, the Court concluded that the Sherman Act precluded granting "a host of state regulatory agencies broad power to grant exemption from an important federal law for reasons
wholly unrelated to federal policy or even to any necessary significant state interest," id. at
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Indeed, the Court has been warned against adopting a "freewheeling approach that contemplates the selective interdiction of those
anticompetitive state regulatory measures that are deemed not
'central' to the limited range of regulatory goals considered 'imperative' by the federal judiciary."" Thus, the Court's interpretation
of the state action exemption not only implicates the federalist
system but also defines the proper relationship between the federal
judiciary and state and local decisionmaking authority.
This Article will chart the development of the state action exemption from its inception in Parker v. Brown 2 to its present status after Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.'3
The Article will identify the federalism concerns that formed the
foundation for the Court's decisions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,'4 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.' 5 and Bates v. State Bar.'6 An
analysis of City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co.17 will

provide particular insight into Boulder's application of the state
action exemption to municipalities, presaging the wide rift that
marked the Boulder decision.' 8 New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin
W. Fox Co.' 9 and CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.20 will capture a rare moment of consensus as to
the proper application of the Parker doctrine, a consensus ultimately shattered by the Boulder decision. The Article will conclude that the Court's present interpretation of the Parker doctrine enables responsible judicial application of the federal antitrust laws while simultaneously permitting the states and localities
to maintain an active role within our federal system.
Parker v. Brown: BIRTH

OF THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION

The advent of the state action exemption generally has been
traced to the decision of Parker v. Brown. The dispute in Parker
603; see infra notes 45-62 and accompanying text.
n Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 640 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
-3 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
14 421 U.S. 773 (1975); see infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
5 428 U.S. 579 (1976); see infra notes 45-70 and accompanying text.

1 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
17 435 U.S. 389 (1978); see infra notes 88-122 and accompanying text.

11See infra notes 150-216.

19439 U.S. 96 (1978); see infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
20 445 U.S. 97 (1980); see infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
21

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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arose when a raisin producer sued California officials administering
a state agricultural prorate program.2 2 The program, designed to
stabilize prices, created a restraint on competition by limiting pro23
duction of raisins.
Examining the antitrust laws, the Court recognized that the
Sherman Act contained no express textual authority regarding its
applicability to state action.2 4 In addition, since the acts of governmental bodies could not normally be viewed as "contracts, combi25
nations or conspiracies" within the meaning of the Sherman Act,
the Court regarded the prorate program as beyond the Act's purview. 28 Perhaps most importantly, the Parker Court was concerned
with preserving the federal system, a consideration that militated
against eroding the states' control over their officers and agents.
22

317 U.S. at 344.

23

Id. at 355.
Id. at 351.

24

21 Id. at 350; see Slater, supra note 3, at 82; Note, Of Raisins and Mushrooms: Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA. L. REv. 1511, 1514 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Parker Antitrust Exemption Note]; Sherman Antitrust Act Comment, supranote 1, at 13940; see also Note, Emerging Limitations on the Immunities of State Action and Efforts to
Influence Governmental Action Under the Sherman Act, 1 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 323, 325
(1971). In an early antitrust case, the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina found
no substantive violation of the Sherman Act by reasoning that state involvement in the
purchasing, transportation, and sale of liquor, was neither a contract nor a business combination or conspiracy. See Lowenstein v. Evans, 67 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895); supra note
1. The Parker Court adopted an analysis quite similar to that of the Lowenstein court and
held that the primary purpose of the Act was to prevent individual and corporate, as opposed to state, combinations that restrain competition. 317 U.S. at 351.
11 317 U.S. at 350; see Slater, supra note 3, at 82. The ParkerCourt recognized that the
Sherman Act made no reference to the state as such, but only to "persons" and "corporaLions." 317 U.S. at 351. Indeed, the Court stated that the legislative history of the Act made
no suggestion that the state shpuld be subject to the federal antitrust prohibitions. Id.; see
Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 698-99 (1974). Despite this proffered justification for the
Parkerdecision, it has been suggested that "the ParkerCourt did not base its construction
of the Sherman Act on legislative history, but instead derived a presumption of congressional intent from the concept of federalism." Page, supra note 3, at 1105.
" 317 U.S. at 351; see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980) (Parkerdoctrine is grounded in our federal structure); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978) (policies of federalism underlie Parker). Some commentators regard the Parkerdecision as based upon federalist principles, "the outcome hing[ing] on a judicial determination that Congress had left the states
some power to regulate their own economic activities and that the judiciary should not undertake to plug the gap that the legislature had left open." Parker Antitrust Exemption
Note, supra note 25, at 1514-15. Others have voiced doubt as to the validity of this federalism interpretation. See, e.g., Slater, supra note 3, at 86; Verkuil, State Action, Due Process
and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328, 332-33 (1975). One
commentator has stated that the ParkerCourt did not need to concern itself with the idea
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Indeed, the Court declared that "[i]n a dual system of government
in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign

. . .

an

unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."2 Rather than
permitting federal encroachment upon the sovereignty of the
states, the Parker Court elected to recognize a general antitrust
exemption for the, anticompetitive activities of the states. Such a
course was necessary because, according to one commentator, without such an exception the vitality of state-created economic, health
and safety regulations would be cast into doubt.29 The Court, however, implicitly qualified the exemption, perhaps in anticipation of
the lobbying pressures that would follow its failure to identify precisely what would qualify as state action, 30 suggesting that the exemption would not be applicable unless the state itself was responsible for the organization and implementation of the program.31
The Court further implied that an anticompetitive program's participants might be subject to antitrust sanctions "if a governmental
of balancing conflicting federal and state interests because the state program questioned in
Parkerwas consistent with the policy of the federal government. Slater, supra, note 3, at 86.
It has also been suggested that the Parker decision can be attributed to the Supreme
Court's fear of the disruptive potential that is inherent in the nullification of a state statutory scheme. Verkuil, supra, at 332-33.
29 317 U.S. at 351.
29 Posner, supra note 26, at 697; see 2 M. HANDLER, TwENTY-FivE YEARS OF ANTITRUST
914-15 (1973). Professor Handler posits that the system of state licensing statutes, stateregulated utility monopolies, and other state monopolies, such as New York's off-track betting industry, would undergo a "revolutionary restructuring" if the limited state police
power over interstate commerce were preempted by federal antitrust laws. 2 M. HANDLER,
supra, at 914-15.
3o See Parker Doctrine Comment, supra note 1, at 515-16; Antitrust Immunity Comment, supra note 1, at 457-58. The Parker decision has engendered confusion with respect
to its applicability. See Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited. The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898, 898 (1977); Comment, City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.: Will Municipal Antitrust Liability Doom
Effective State-Local Government Relations?, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 129, 129-30 (1979).
The source of this confusion has been traced to the ParkerCourt's failure to provide guidance as to what activity qualifies as state action. See Richards, supra note 5, at 547.
11 317 U.S. at 351; see Note, Antitrust Law and Municipal Corporations:Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Coverage under the Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEO. L.J.
1547, 1551-52 (1977). A list of cases interpreting the Parkerrequirement of state organization and implementation of the program includes California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) ("challenged restraint must be 'one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy' [and] 'actively supervised' by the
State itself"); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 994 (3d Cir. 1982); Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1982); Morgan v.
Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1981); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 3637 (1st Cir. 1981).
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entity acts as a co-conspirator" in a private restraint.32
A close reading of the Parker decision, in light of the language
qualifying the exemption, illustrates the Court's intention to defer
to a state's regulatory authority only when the state has committed
its governmental apparatus to a particular scheme. Such a restriction would limit private industry's ability to attenuate the national
antitrust policy. Accordingly, the Parker doctrine seems to imply
that permitting private interests to exercise undue influence over
state agencies would neither further the aims of state sovereignty
nor, ultimately, federalism itself3 3

Goldfarb: DEFINING Parker's PROTECTION
For 32 years the lower courts, receiving little assistance from
the Supreme Court, 4 struggled to define the parameters of the
Parker exemption.3 5 Finally, in 1975 the Supreme Court reexamined the Parker doctrine. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 6 the
Court held that a minimum fee schedule, published by a county
bar association, constituted price fixing in violation of the Sherman
37

Act.

The state bar had argued that in issuing the fee schedule re'2See Note, supra note 31, at 1551-52.
s See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1180 (8th Cir. 1982)
(electric company's "manipulation" of state regulatory scheme violative of antitrust laws);
Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 862 (9th Cir. 1965) (bribes to
state purchasing agent resulted in violation of Clayton Act).
" See Handler, Anti-Trust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1374 (1978). For decades,
the only guide provided lower courts in their struggle to identify which state-sanctioned
activities were beyond the reach of the Sherman Act was Chief Justice Stone's brief treatment of the issue in Parker.See 317 U.S. at 350-52. The result was "a crazy quilt of disparate rationales and rubrics." Handler, supra, at 1374.
35 See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974);
Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); Saenz v.
University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973); Business Aides, Inc. v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973); Norman's on the Waterfront,
Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
36421 U.S. 773 (1975). Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the Goldfarb
case.
37 Id. at 788, 791. The suit in Goldfarb arose when a Virginia family sought a title
examination in order to receive financing for the purchase of a home, id. at 775, and discovered that no attorney would perform the title search for less than the minimum amount
appearing in the fee schedule published by the Fairfax County Bar Association, id. at 77678. The fee schedule contained an enforcement mechanism, although the bar association
had never taken formal disciplinary action to compel adherence. Id. at 776-77.
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ports and ethical opinions3 it was merely implementing the fee
provisions of the ethical codes. 39 The county bar, a voluntary association rather than a state agency,40 asserted that its activities were
state action since "the State Bar 'prompted' it to issue fee schedules. 4 1 A unanimous Supreme Court, however, finding that mandate for the price floors emanated from either the Virginia Supreme Court or the state legislature, 42 ruled that there was
insufficient state action to trigger an antitrust exemption. s Thus,
Goldfarb distilled a fundamental principle from the ambiguity of
Parker: an exempt activity must be a response to the command of

the state.44

Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.: SOVEREIGN
Parker IssuE

COMPULSION AS A

Although Goldfarb identified the threshold state action inquiry-whether the activity is a response to the command of the
See Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 170 (1971); Virginia State Bar
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 98 (1960). Commenting on the schedule reports and ethical
opinions, the Court noted: "[A]ny lawyer who contemplated ignoring the fee schedules must
have been aware that professional sanctions were possible. . . ." 421 U.S. at 778 n.6.
" 421 U.S. at 789-90. As authorized by the Virginia legislature, the ethical codes were
adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law. Id. at 789.
'0 Id. at 790. Because the county bar association was a purely voluntary association of
attorneys, it possessed no formal authority to enforce the fee schedule. Id. at 776.
41

Id. at 790.

42 Id. The Court remarked that it could not be said that Virginia, through its state

supreme court rules, mandated the anticompetitive prices since no Virginia statute referred
to minimum fee schedules. Id. The regulation of fees, therefore, was found to be left to the
Virginia Supreme Court, which only mentioned advisory fees but did not direct the bar
association to supply them. Id.; see infra note 44.
43 421 U.S. at 791.
44Id. at 790. The Court stated that "[t]he threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action... [which] the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." Id. Moreover, the
Court implied a requirement that the state exhibit an active interest in an anticompetitive
scheme before the protection of Parkeris triggered, stating that "[a]lthough the State Bar
apparently has been granted the power to issue ethical opinions, there is no indication in
this record that the Virginia Supreme Court approves the opinions." Id. This requirement,
that government machinery be committed to anticompetitive conduct before the activity
can be exempt from the antitrust laws, foreshadowed the later standard that there be substantial supervision by the state acting as a sovereign. See infra note 143 and accompanying
text; see also 7 J. VON KALiNowsKI, ANTIRUsT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 46.02 (1982);
Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 89 HARv. L. REV. 715, 725 (1976). In Goldfarb, the absence of a state
requirement for the fee schedule precluded a finding of "state action" for antitrust purposes. 421 U.S. at 791.
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state-Cantor v.Detroit Edison Co." is the only Supreme Court
decision in the Parker line that significantly addresses the impact
of the state action exemption on the lobbying activities of private
entities." In Cantor, a retail druggist who sold light bulbs sued
Detroit Edison Company, a privately owned utility, for its role in
allegedly tying the sale of light bulbs to its utility service pursuant
to a program approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission. A divided Supreme Court denied the appropriateness of an
antitrust exemption to the distribution program, although five Justices reached accord on the type of inquiry to be made."
Justice Stevens, author of the Court's opinion,49 asserted that
when a private citizen is merely obeying his state sovereign, it
would be unfair to punish him for violating conflicting federal
law.50 Expounding upon this "unfairness rationale," Justice Stevens noted that a rule which prohibited imposition of antitrust liability on a party who merely obeyed a state command would have
limited relevance, since "typically cases of this kind involve a
48 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
46 Id. at 609-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of
the Court, denied the Cantor defendants a Parkerexemption because the state itself was
not chargeable with anticompetitive practices. Id. at 591-92.
41 Id. at 581. The retail store operator, Cantor, sought treble damages and an injunction
to enjoin the utility from tying the sale of light bulbs to its distribution of electrical service.
Id. at 581-82 n.3. See Note, Will Detroit Edison Turn Off Parker's Power?, 15 AM. Bus. L.J.
379, 381-82 (1978). Pursuant to such tying agreements, a seller conditions the sale of one
product on the purchase of another. The traditional objection to such an arrangement is
that "they enable a firm having a monopoly in one market to obtain a monopoly in a second
market." R. PosNR, ANrrnusr LAW: AN EcONOMIc PERSPECTIVE 172 (1976).
In Detroit Edison's marketing area, the utility was the sole electricity supplier for
roughly 5 million people. The utility also furnished its consumers with almost 50 percent of
the standard sized bulbs most frequently used. 428 U.S. at 582. The bulbs were provided
under an exchange program whereby bulbs were initially installed in all permanent fixtures
and then replaced in proportion to the customers' estimated use of electricity; no direct
charge was incurred. Id. at 583 n.5. The expense to Detroit Edison presumably was reflected
in the cost of servicing customers though this cost was not reported to the Michigan Public
Service Commission. Id. at 582-83. The Court recognized, therefore, that since 1916 "the
Commission's approval of... [Detroit Edison's] tariffs has included implicit approval of
the lamp-exchange program." Id. at 583. Detroit Edison argued that such approval constituted a shield from antitrust regulation; both the district court and the court of appeals
agreed. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd,
513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
4' Chief Justice Burger described the proper threshold inquiry as focusing on the challenged activity, not the identity of the party. 428 U.S. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
4 The plurality did not find Parker to be appropriate precedent for state compulsion
cases of the Cantor variety, id. at 591, since the result would be to punish a private person
for obeying the mandate of a state sovereign, id. at 592.
50 Id. at 592.
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blend of private and public decisionmaking." 51 The plurality further observed that neither state authorization, 52 approval,53 encouragement, 54 nor participation5 5 in anticompetitive conduct
would confer an antitrust exemption.5 6
Concluding that it would not be unfair to hold Detroit Edison
accountable under the antitrust laws,57 Justice Stevens refocused
his inquiry upon whether Congress intended to superimpose its antitrust standards on conduct already regulated by the states. The
mere possibility of a conflict between a state's regulatory policy
and the federal antitrust policy was not enough, in Justice Stevens'
view, to support an implied exemption from antitrust.5 8 The plurality believed that Congress had not intended to give state regulatory agencies more power than federal agencies to carve out exemptions from the antitrust laws.5 9 Thus, it would appear that an
61Id. at 582. The Court noted that even in Parker, significant private participation
existed in the proration program's planning. Id. at 592 n.25. The program's effectuation was

conditioned upon the approval of a prescribed number of private producers. Id.
52 Id. at 592 n.26 ("It cannot be said that any State may give a corporation ... authority to restrain... commerce against the will of... Congress.") (quoting Northern Sec. Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 346 (1904)).
53428 U.S. at 592 n.27. ("[A] State does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act 'by declaring ... [their] action ... lawful.' ") (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317

U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
" 428 U.S. at 592-93 n.28 ("It is not enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is

'prompted' by state action;... [the] activities must be compelled by... the State acting
as a sovereign.") (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
55 428 U.S. at 592-93; cf. Continental Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962)
(fact that conspiracy involved acts of agents of foreign government does not insulate corporation from antitrust laws).
w 428 U.S. at 592-93. The Court concluded that the State of Michigan was neutral
toward Detroit Edison's exchange program. Id. Furthermore, the Court did not consider its
holding to be in conflict with the Parkerdecision since the state never required any utility
to implement a bulb exchange scheme. Id. at 594 n.32; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 214, at 81 (1978) (where agency exceeds statutory authority in approving
activity, individual will be subject to sanctions for antitrust violations).
57 428 U.S. at 594-95. The risk of unjustified punitive damages was held not to exist in
Cantor since Detroit Edison never reasonably believed its program would be exempt from
antitrust liability, but had exercised sufficient freedom of choice in enacting the exchange
program to warrant the court holding it responsible for the resulting anticompetitive consequences. Id. at 593. Further, the Court emphasized that the decision was not unjust in light
of the alternative holding, that federal antitrust laws do not apply to anticompetitive actions approved by the state. Id. at 595-96. In addition, the assumption that Congress did not
intend laws to apply to state-regulated areas would not foreclose the enforcement of the
antitrust statutes to unregulated areas such as the light bulb market. Id. Since the monopolistic utility already was regulated by antitrust standards, no hardship resulted by submitting its business activity in competitive areas to the same criteria. Id. at 596.
as Id. at 596.

59Id. Federal agencies possess the requisite authority to shield private conduct from
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implied exemption would not be warranted unless it was absolutely
essential to make the regulatory act function, and, even then, such
an exemption should be no broader than necessary. 0
Underlying the Court's rejection of an exemption in Cantor
was its determination that denial of Parker's protection would in
no way threaten Michigan's execution of its sovereign functions. A
majority of the Court agreed that the state's policy with respect to
the program was one of mere neutrality.6 1 One commentator has
described Cantor's fairness language, coupled with its emphasis on
the state's neutrality, as "merely an alternative linguistic form" of
the threshold inquiry called for in Goldfarb, with the only difference being that Cantor "shifts the focus of inquiry from the decisionmaking action of the state to the decisionmaking freedom of
'6 2
the private party.

This emphasis on the private entity's participation in initiating the anticompetitive compulsion appears to undercut the policies enunciated in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,3 in which the Court accorded antitrust
immunity to private entities' concerted efforts to influence legislative action. 4 The Noerr Court observed that such conduct should
be protected notwithstanding its anticompetitive intent and consequences, since application of the antitrust laws to lobbying activiantitrust liability only if a "plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions" exists. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 692-93 (1975) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963));
see 428 U.S. at 596-97 n.36; see also United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422
U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939); Posadas v.
National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
"0428 U.S. at 596 n.34, 597; see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
389-91 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). Justice Stewart, dissenting in Cantor,argued that the plurality opinion was based upon the mistaken premise that implied repeal of federal antitrust
laws by inconsistent state regulations may be possible. 428 U.S. at 629 (Stewart, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stewart, "'implied repeal"' is not only "'not favored .. , it is
impossible."' Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2).
61 428 U.S. at 584-85.
62 Case Note, Immunity

Denied to State Approved Utility Practice-Cantorv. Detroit
Edison Co., 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 912, 934. Cantor added a new dimension to the Parkerline
by holding that absent sovereign compulsion private entities do not qualify for an antitrust
exemption. Id. At least one commentator has postulated that even if a program was not the
product of state legislation, an exemption may still be denied. Note, State Action Immunity
and State "Neutrality"in Regulated and Compelled Activities, 55 N.C.L. Rav. 207, 210
n.21 (1977).
365 U.S. 127 (1961).

Id. at 135.
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ties would impede the free flow of information vital to a representative democracy and would have a chilling effect on the right to
petition. s
Although the dissent in Cantor characterized the plurality
opinion's failure to immunize lobbying efforts as an interference
with the policies established in Noerr, recognition of such ostensible conflict may be simply a more realistic assessment of the regulatory process at the state and local levels." The Cantor Court's
comment, that Goldfarb's exacting verbal formula will not confer
antitrust immunity for compliance with any requirement of the
state, suggests that presence of a state mandate is merely the first
element of the state action exemption formula, requiring, in addition, a clear articulation of regulatory intent.67 Viewed in this light,
Cantor provides a check on the ease with which special interests
might capture or overwhelm state regulatory bodies by requiring,
as a natural incident to the decisionmaking process, that the state
articulate its preference for regulation over competition. Showing
deference to the federalism rationale underlying Parker, Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion emphasized that this approach was
designed to prevent private entities from undermining the antitrust laws "for reasons wholly unrelated either to federal policy or
even to any necessary significant state interest." 8 Rather than lim" Id. at 137-38. The Noerr doctrine immunizes from antitrust liability the petitioning
of the executive and judicial branches, as well as the legislative branch. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) (lobbying before the
judiciary is exempt from antitrust laws); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
669 (1965) (lobbying activities before administrative officials is exempt); see also Fischel,
Antitrust Liabilityfor Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 80, 80-81 (1977) (private exemptions
from antitrust laws generally are limited to those activities protected by the right to
petition).
" The dissent in Cantormaintained: "[The utility] proposes a tariff and, if the tariff is
approved, it obeys its terms. The first action cannot give rise to antitrust liability under
Noerr and the second-compliance... under command of state law-is immune from antitrust liability under Parker and Goldfarb." 428 U.S. at 624 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Surely,
if antitrust liability were to arise from lobbying efforts of private parties, the power of state
governments to impose restraints would be impaired. It follows that "a rule permitting
Sherman Act liability to arise from private parties' compliance with [state] rules would impair the exercise of State power." Id. at 623 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Note, supra note
30, at 904-05. Nevertheless, the plurality apparently believed that the Michigan Public Service Commission was merely "rubber-stamping" the utility's tariffs. See infra note 70 and
accompanying text.
"7See 428 U.S. at 584-85; see also 7 J. VON KALNowsKu, supra note 44, § 46.03(2)(c),
68 428 U.S. at 603.
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iting the flow of information to decisionmaking bodies, a result the
Noerr doctrine was designed to foreclose, 9 Cantor's approach
might actually guarantee that the decisionmakers explore all sides
of an issue as part of the process of articulating a regulatory
70
mandate.

Bates v. State Bar: ESTABLISHING

A THREE-STEP TEST FOR
PROTECTION

Parker

All of the disagreement that marred the Cantor Court's exploration of the "sovereign compulsion" aspects of the Parker doctrine dissipated the following year in Bates v. State Bar.71 The
Bates dispute involved the suspension of two Arizona attorneys
who placed an advertisement in a newspaper, listing their fees in
violation of an Arizona disciplinary rule. 72 In defending against
their suspension, the attorneys argued that the ban on attorney

"' See Fischel,

supra note 65, at 82-83; supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 67. Justice Blackmun agreed that "some degree of
affirmative articulation by the State of its conscientious intent to sanction the challenged
scheme" was useful, but concluded that neither mere authorization nor articulation was
enough. 428 U.S. at 610 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Therefore, "state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall, like any other, if its potential harms outweigh its benefits." Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring). As between purely private activity and state-sanctioned conduct, however, state sanction figures powerfully in the calculus of harm and benefit. Id. at
610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Case Note, supra note 62, at 923.
The dissent in Cantor ssverely criticized Justice Blackmun's rationale, arguing that
Goldfarb clearly refined Parkerto hold that anticompetitive activity must be compelled by
the state, not merely prompted, and that the exemption should be limited to those areas
where, "by the State's own judgment," the state sovereign interest is strongest. 428 U.S. at
637 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent, therefore, objected to the Court's adoption of an
approach that permits the federal judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of the state
in determining whether anticompetitive measures are "sufficiently central ... to a judicial
conception of the proper scope of state utility regulation." Id. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding these admonitions, the plurality was unconcerned with the discretion
vested in the judiciary to refine and define the state action exemption, id. at 603, since
under the commerce clause state activity is already subject to searching review, id. at 612
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
One commentator has summarized the debate concerning Cantor as follows:
Cantor should be narrowly interpreted to mean that a private party may not
shield himself from antitrust liability by having a regulatory body rubber-stamp a
tariff which includes a report or description of an anticompetitive activity. Thus,
Cantor does not undercut No'r, but rather, represents a realistic assessment of
the regulatory process.
Fischel, supra note 65, at 92.
70

71 433 U.S. 350 (1977).

7 Id. at 354-55; see 72A AiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1982-1983) (original
version at Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1976), incorporatingMODEL CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RESPONSmni~Ty DR 2-101(B) (1976)).
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advertising violated the Sherman Act and unduly infringed upon
their first amendment rights. 3 Justice Blackmun, speaking for the
Court,'7 4 extended Parker's protection to the challenged discipli-

nary rule holding that it was "an activity of the State of Arizona
acting as sovereign.

'7 5

In a reexamination of Cantor,Justice Black-

mun detailed several elements that distinquished it from Bates,
and, in effect, articulated a three-step test for Parker protection.
The Court first noted that the claim in Bates was brought
against the Arizona Supreme Court while the defendant in Cantor
was a private party.76 In Justice Blackmun's view, "Cantor would

have been an entirely different case if the claim had been directed
against a public official or public agency, rather than against a private party.

'77

Second, the Court observed that there was no state

regulatory interest in Cantor's light bulb exchange program while
the state's interest in regulating the legal profession in Bates was
clearly well-established.7 s Third, Justice Blackmun acknowledged
73

433 U.S. at 356.

74 The entire Court agreed that the Parkerrule protected appellee from antitrust liabil-

ity. See id. at 363. Four members dissented, however, from the majority's invalidation of the
statutory prohibition of legal advertising. See id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 389 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 404
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
7 Id. at 356-57 (quoting In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 397, 555 P.2d 640, 643 (1976) (en
banc)). The Bates Court reaffirmed the reasoning of Goldfarb and Cantor, but distinguished
the present case on its facts. 433 U.S. at 359-63. Noting that the minimum fee schedules in
Goldfarb deserved no antitrust exemption because they were not mandated by the state,
Justice Blackmun contended that the advertising restraint in Bates was "'compelled by
direction of the State acting as a sovereign,'" the restraint being affirmatively promulgated
by the state supreme court. See id. at 359-60 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
76 433 U.S. at 361.
7 Id. at 361. Justice Blackmun observed that the Cantor plurality appeared to read
Parkeras applicable only to suits against public officials. Id. at 361 n.13. It should be noted,
however, that since Justice Blackmun and the Chief Justice appeared to join Cantor's three
dissenters in holding that Parkercould apply regardless of the identity of the defendants, a
majority of the Cantor Court apparently had rejected this view. See Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 603-04 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
id. at 613 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Perhaps Justice Blackmun's comment in Bates
refers to his Cantor concurrence, in which he acknowledged that a state might be more
likely to receive Parker protection than would a private entity under his "rule of reason"
analysis. See id. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (fact of state promulgation of anticompetitive regulation influential in striking balance between harm and benefit of such
regulation).
78 433 U.S. at 361-62. Emphasizing the fact that "[flederal interference with a State's
traditional regulation of a profession is entirely unlike the intrusion the Court sanctioned in
Cantor," Justice Blackmun observed that Bates was presaged by Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), in which the Court acknowledged that the
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that while the light bulb program in Cantor was initiated by a private party qualified only by the passive acceptance of the state
regulatory commission,79 the disciplinary rules in Bates were
viewed as "reflect[ing] a clear articulation of the State's policy
with regard to professional behavior." 0 In a summary that touched
the very heart of the Parker doctrine, the Court explained that
where a state's role is readily apparent and its intent is lucidly and
positively expressed, there is little justification for the sentiment
that federal policy would be unjustly subordinated to the concerns
of the state."'
The Bates opinion fully appreciates the state action exemption's precarious perch between federal antitrust policy and the
sovereign functions of the states.8 2 The three steps identified by
the Court as crucial in determining the applicability of Parkerprotection were clearly designed to maintain that delicate balance.
The initial inquiry of whether the state was the real party-in-interest would seem, at first glance, to unduly restrict the autonomy of
the states. 3 A closer reading, however, suggests that the Court
viewed the state's active supervision of an anticompetitive activity
as essential for application of the exemption doctrine. Such a reading strengthens the Court's claim that the sovereign function is
crucial to the separate existence of the states.84 Locating the presState of Virginia was free to regulate the professional conduct of its pharmacists or shelter
them from competition. Id. at 362 & n.16 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
80

See supra note 75.
433 U.S. at 362. In addition to reflecting state policy, the disciplinary rules in Bates

were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme

Court-in enforcement proceedings." Id.
81 Id.
82 See

id. The Court indicated that active participation by the state in revision of the
rules of professional behavior lessened its concern that "federal policy [was] being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to state policy." Id.; see also Rogers, Municipal

Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System, 1980 Aruz. ST. L.J. 305, 312.
81The Cantor dissenters believed that permitting municipalities to be punished under
the antitrust laws for conduct in compliance with state law necessarily restricts state action.
See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 622-23 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting); ac-

cord Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 &
n.17 (1961). Commentators have criticized the rule limiting the state action exemption to

governmental entities, disapproving an overly restrictive interpretation of the exemption.
See, e.g., Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1976); Posner, supra note 26, at 720-21; Simmons & Fornaciari, State
Regulation as an Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U.
CIN. L. REV. 61, 68-69 (1974).
8, A function that is crucial to the separate existence of the states necessarily would be
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ence of a clear articulation of state policy is thus closely connected
with the question of who is the real party-in-interest.8 5
Indeed, the first and third steps provide a means by which the
Court can measure the importance to the state of a particular anticompetitive program. As such, they provide a marginally intrusive means by which the judiciary may reconcile the tension between antitrust policy and the sovereignty of the states. This
standard is in contrast, however, to the Court's second inquiry into
whether the state possessed an independent regulatory interest in
the anticompetitive rationale.8 This latter investigation invites the
Court to scrutinize the substance of states' regulatory assumptions,
thereby subjecting itself to charges of usurping legislative
functions.87
Lafayette: THE Parker DOCTRINE AND MuNmIPAL GOVERNMENT

Although Bates appeared to calm the unsettled waters left in
the wake of Cantor, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
a governmental function, and its exercise, therefore, would not constitute an antitrust violation under the Parkerrule. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (state adoption of
prorate agricultural program constituted "the execution of a governmental policy" and thus
not a Sherman Act violation). It is the determination of what kinds of functions are essential to the separate existence of state government that makes application of this test problematic. See supra note 30.
5 The Bates Court apparently believed that even if an independent state interest in
promulgating the disciplinary regulations were found to exist, unless the regulations clearly
expressed a vital state policy they could still be found violative of the antitrust laws. See
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 H-nv. L. Rav. 435, 438 (1981); Note, supra note 44, at 722-24.
" The existence or nonexistence of an "independent" state regulatory interest in the
anticompetitive regulation under scrutiny generally has been evaluated in terms of Justice
Blackmun's economic impact test. This test weighs the economic "harms" inflicted upon
competition by the regulation against the benefits the regulation is meant to produce, upholding the regulation only if the benefits are greater. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
361-62 (1977) (Blackmun, J.); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Page, supra note 3, at 1124-25. Professor Page argues that such
an economic balancing compels evaluation of the merits of state legislation in an inappropriate forum and thus infringes upon the rights of states to engage in economic regulation. See
Page, supranote 3, at 1124-25; see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supranote 56, S 215c, at
98. This standard has also been criticized as an undesirable reinstitution of substantive due
process in the context of economic regulation. See Verkuil, supranote 27, at 334-35. But see
Posner, supra note 26, at 707-12, 714-20 (approving the economic standard only if used in
conjunction with other tests).
87 See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 630-31 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Inquiry into the justifications for a state regulation, it has been argued, undermines
Parker's deference to the judgments of the state legislatures. See Page, supra note 3, at
1123.
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Co.8" brought a new wave of judicial turbulence. The dispute arose
when the city of Lafayette, organized under the laws of Louisiana,8 9 charged the Louisiana Power & Light Co. with various antitrust violations.9 0 The utility counterclaimed, seeking damages and
injunctive relief for certain antitrust offenses allegedly committed
by Lafayette. 9 Faced with the task of determining if the city of
Lafayette was automatically exempt from the antitrust counterclaim, the Supreme Court was unable to recapture the solidarity
characteristic of Bates. Instead, only five Justices agreed that municipal governments did not automatically qualify for an exemption, while no more than a plurality of four could agree on the
proper standards for applying the state action exemption to
92

cities.

In an acknowledgement of the grave importance of the federal
policy favoring antitrust enforcement, Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion, was able to characterize only two policies as possessing sufficient weight to bring an activity within an implied exemption from antitrust liability. 3 The first was the Noerr exemption of
- 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
89 The State of Louisiana "grant[ed] . . . [the City of Lafayette] power to own and
operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their city limits," and the city exercised this power. See id. at 391 & nn.1-2, 392.
9 Id. at 392 n.5. The city asserted that the defendants conspired to restrain trade and
to monopolize "the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power" by obstructing the building, financing and operation of competing power plants, by refusing to
sell power at wholesale rates, and "by engaging in boycotts. . . sham litigation and other
improper means ....
." Id.
91 Id. at 392. In its counterclaim, Louisiana Power & Light alleged that the city had
conspired with a private electric cooperative to delay the construction of a nuclear power
plant, and had also attempted to restrict competition by using debenture covenants, longterm power supply contracts, and agreements conditioning the continuance of water and gas
supplies on purchase of electrical power from the city. Id. at 392 n.6.
2 The Chief Justice and Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan
in concluding that municipalities are not entitled to an automatic exemption from the antitrust laws. See id. at 403-08. Chief Justice Burger was unable to concur in the plurality's
rationale, reasoning that any for-profit organization, even a municipality, remains subject to
the Sherman Act. See id. at 418-20, 425-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). The plurality thought that the Parker rule should absolve a city from liability when
the city's action was the fruit of a state policy of fostering such monopolies. See id. at 41317. The dissenters adopted a middle ground asserting that municipalities, by virtue of electoral accountability, are "a far cry from the private accumulations of wealth that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate." Id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Since municipal
conduct falls outside the ambit of the antitrust laws' policy, Parkerprotects such conduct
whether or not it is rooted in state policy. Id. at 432-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 399-400. Justice Brennan noted that the presumption against exclusions is so
strong that "even when Congress by subsequent legislation establishes a regulatory regime

1983]

STATE ACTION EXEMPTION

protecting the activities of individuals seeking to obtain the passage of legislation either favorable to themselves or unfavorable to
competitors.9 4 The Parker doctrine was identified as the only other
policy worthy of overriding the fundamental considerations promoted by the antitrust laws. 5 The Lafayette majority emphasized
that the Parker and Noerr doctrines shared a "potential conflict
with policies of signal importance in our national tradition and
governmental structure of federalism." ' Yet the mere fact that antitrust enforcement implicated the policies promoted by either
doctrine was not considered sufficient to overcome the presumption against implied exclusions. The Court would offer these ex97
emptions only when the policies were severely impinged.
Unable to discover any reason independent of Parker for
shielding the municipality, Justice Brennan turned his attention to
over an area of commercial activity, the antitrust laws will not be displaced unless it appears
that the antitrust and regulatory provisions are plainly repugnant." Id. at 398; see United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 & n.28 (1963).
11435 U.S. at 399; see Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961). The Noerr exemption was accorded lobbying railroads to avoid
"imped[ing] the open communication between the polity and its lawmakers" and to avoid a
"threat to the constitutionally protected right of petition." 435 U.S. at 399. This "open communication" was perceived as being "vital to the functioning of a representative democracy." Id. For a general discussion of lobbyists' exemptions, see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 56,
201-05; Comment, Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity and Proprietary Government Activity, 1981 Amiz. ST. L.J. 749, 755-61.
95 435 U.S. at 400.
96 Id.

97Id. The majority believed that the city of Lafayette failed to demonstrate the possible existence of any countervailing policies that could justify an antitrust exemption. To the
argument that "it would be anomalous to subject municipalities to criminal and civil penalties imposed upon violators of the antitrust laws," the Court responded that municipalities
have been required to comply with other federal laws that impose criminal sanctions. Id.;
see, e.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-86 (1944) (Shipping Act of 1916
applied against a city and a state); Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 46364, 474 (1941) (city criminally liable under the Elkins Act for collaborating with a common
carrier to grant "discriminatory advantages" to shippers). More importantly, in rejecting the
claim that antitrust laws should not apply to municipal acts performed as public services
and not for private profit, the majority observed, "[i]f municipalities were free to make
economic choices counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to
their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be
introduced at odds with the comprehensive national policy Congress established." 435 U.S.
at 408. This view of the federal antitrust statutes is in accord with other Supreme Court
decisions which held that these statutes should be broadly interpreted in order to meet the
goals of federal antitrust policy. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1980); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,
610 (1972); see also Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1978) (Sherman Act broad enough to include antitrust suits brought against American firms by foreign
powers).
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the central question of whether Parker's protection was available
to political subdivisions of the state.9 8 A plurality of the Court rejected outright any assertion that mere status as a governmental
entity triggers the protection described in Parker.Since cities did
not enjoy independent sovereign status, federal deference was proportionally limited.9 The plurality refused to extend automatic
protection under the Parker doctrine, noting that municipalities
would be exempt from antitrust liability only to the extent that
they operate "pursuant to state policy [designed] to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."1 00
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion complained that too
much judicial energy was spent determining the Sherman Act's
reach over the anticompetitive activities of the states and localities
and neglected the more significant issue of whether its reach extended to the "proprietary enterprises of municipalities."' 10 1 In
developing a dichotomy in which the nature of the actgovernmental or proprietary-is dispositive, the Chief Justice refused to exempt the municipal activity from antitrust liability,
stating that the activity of Lafayette was "clearly a business activ'10 2
ity; activity in which a profit was realized.
Dissenting, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, argued that both the plurality and the Chief
Justice had misconstrued Parker.0 3 Justice Stewart stressed that
98 435 U.S. at 408.
99 Id. at 412; accord Lake Country Estates, Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) (counties and municipalities not protected under the eleventh
amendment unless Congress and the state so agree); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529, 530 (1890) (county is different than the state for eleventh amendment purposes). Justice Brennan reemphasized, however, that the plurality opinion neither proscribed municipal monopolies nor threatened "legitimate exercise[s] of governmental power." 435 U.S. at
416-17. In conceding that a subordinate government will not be able to claim Parkerprotection as easily as a state government, Justice Brennan argued that if it appeared from the
municipal charter of authority that the state contemplated the anticompetitive activity, the
Parker rule would apply. Id. at 414-15. Detailed legislative authorization would not be required. Id. at 415.
100 435 U.S. at 413.
101Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102 Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The Chief Justice
believed that the facts showed this controversy to be a mere dispute between competing
utilities. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
read Chief Justice Burger's requirement that the state action exemption be no broader than
necessary to serve the states' "legitimate purposes" as implicitly incorporating a requirement that the state actively impose the anticompetitive restraint "as an act of government"
before the exemption would apply. Id. at 417-18 (Marshall, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 430-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun did not share the dissent-
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where an anticompetitive activity is governmental, rather than pri10 4
vate in nature, no violation of the Sherman Act should be found.
The dissent identified the fundamental error of the plurality and
the Chief Justice as the "failure to recognize the difference between private activities authorized or regulated by government on
the one hand, and the actions of the government itself on the
other."1 5 The dissent was certain that municipalities, as public entities, were entitled to Parker's protection. 0 6 Justice Stewart accordingly criticized the Lafayette decision as an incursion into the
province of state and local government,10 7 that limits the inherent
flexibility of a federal system 0 8 "by demanding extensive legislative control over municipal action."' 0 9
ers' view that inquiry into the nature of municipal activity would result in judicial interference with state legislative decisionmaking. Id. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He
acknowledged, however, that to grant immunity to a municipality that engaged in anticompetitive action in combination with private parties would be to extend to municipalities
greater protection from liability than that enjoyed by the states. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
104 Id. at 428-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In arguing that municipalities should not be
treated as private persons for Sherman Act purposes, the dissent emphasized that city governments are accountable to the public through the electoral process. Id. at 430 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). This accountability, it was asserted, distinguishes municipalities from "the private accumulations of wealth" against which the Sherman Act was aimed. Id. (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). It appears that the dissenters would apply the Parkerexemption whenever the
defendant is a public entity. See id. at 431-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The Chief Justice, on the other hand, insisted that prior decisions of the Court based
the granting of the state action exemption upon whether the activity in question is governmental or proprietary in nature. See id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The dissenters criticized the governmental-proprietary standard on the ground that
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions cannot be made with certainty. See id. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Burger has suggested
that this determination merely necessitates a showing of "functions essential to [a state's]
separate and independent existence," id. at 423 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976)), commentators have discounted this type of analysis as circular, since an "essential" function of state
government must necessarily be governmental, see Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth
Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1871, 1881 (1976).
104 435 U.S. at 429-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 434 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting). It was feared that adoption of an activity-based
standard would impair the ability of states to delegate power to municipalities, burdening
state governments with purely local concerns. Id. at 434-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Additionally, both Justices Stewart and Blackmun feared that the impact of antitrust awards on
local governments could be financially ruinous. See id. at 439-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id.
at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Curtin, Antitrust Comes to the Cities- Analysis of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. and Its Effect on Municipal Anti-
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A central thrust of the dissent's concern was that the Lafayette result presented a serious setback to the decentralization
movement fostered by National League of Cities v. Usery.110 In
Usery, Justice Rehnquist recognized the sovereignty of the states
as an outer limit to the reach of Congress' commerce power."" Basing his opinion partly upon the historic balance of power between
the states and the national government, Justice Rehnquist ruled
that, absent some compelling national interest that necessitated
state compliance with national guidelines, those traditional state
activities integral to a state's separate existence in the federal sys112
tem would be beyond the reach of national regulation.
The Usery opinion, by preserving the attributes of sovereignty
and the functions essential to the "separate and independent existence" of the states,11 3 contemplated a decentralized government
that would permit local problems to be dealt with in a local forum.11

4

It is not all that clear that the Lafayette decision actually

sabotages these principles, despite the dissent's assertions to the
contrary. Certainly Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in
Lafayette, with its focus upon the nature of the entity's activities,
made the governmental-proprietary distinction in order to diminish the impact of antitrust enforcement on the sovereign character
trust Liability, 5 U. DAYTON L. REv. 7, 36-37 (1980) (courts unlikely to impose treble damages on municipalities unless municipal officials knowingly become involved in private
conspiracies in restraint of trade).
110 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
" Id. at 852. The Court in Usery struck down amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to virtually
all employees of state and municipal governments. Id. at 836; see Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55.
112 426 U.S. at 852. One example of a case in which a "compelling national interest"
could be said to justify encroachment upon state sovereignty is Fry v. United States, 421
U.S. 542 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federally imposed limits
on annual wage increases for state employees. Id. at 545. Citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968), the Court deemed the statute a justifiable intrusion upon state sovereignty because it was enacted to counter an economic emergency of national proportions and was not
overly intrusive. 421 U.S. at 548. When it overruled Maryland v. Wirtz in Usery, the Court
distinguished Fry on factual grounds. 426 U.S. at 852-53.
11 426 U.S. at 851-52. State functions that the Usery Court deemed worthy of protection include sanitation, public health services, fire prevention, police protection, and the
preservation of parks and recreational facilities. Id. at 851.
2 4 See id. at 851-52. Advocates of the majority approach in Usery have emphasized the
role of the states as a testing ground for innovative social programs. See, e.g., FERC v.
Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 2152-53 (1982) (O'Connor, J, concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Note, supra note 105, at 1886.

1983]

STATE ACTION EXEMPTION

of the states. 115 The Lafayette plurality itself indicated its concern
with preserving the attributes of state sovereignty by emphasizing
the availability of an exemption for an official action directed by
the states.1 16
Justice Marshall, in his Lafayette concurrence, recognized
that the common ground between the plurality opinion and that of
Chief Justice Burger was a concern for balancing state sovereignty
with national policy. 11 7 If this recognition is accurate, the real
threat may be more subtle than a direct assault upon the federalism principles underlying Usery.1 5 Justice Marshall's inquiry as to
the extent a state activity should be permitted to restrict competition"1 9 is highly reminiscent of the second step in the Bates inquiry.1 20 Justice Stewart's dissent meanwhile, in response to this
willingness to scrutinize state action, registered a strong criticism
that the "decision will cause excessive judicial interference not
only with the procedures by which a State makes its governmental
decisions, but with their substance as well. 1 21
Thus, after Lafayette, the state action exemption was characterized not only by a divided Court, but also by an interpretation
of the Parkerdoctrine that posed serious problems for intergovern-

'"

See 435 U.S. at 424-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
216Id. at 408-10. The Lafayette plurality denied that cities are sovereign, and felt that
widespread economic disruption could occur if local governments were allowed to place their
interests above those dictated by federal antitrust policy. Id. at 411-13.
17 See id. at 417-18 (Marshall, J., concurring).
12 The plurality opinion in Lafayette suggests that the state action exemption should
not be granted unless the anticompetitive state policy in question is supported by federal
policy. See 435 U.S. at 409 & n.39. Justice Brennan, author of the opinion, emphasized that
in Parkerthe California Agricultural Prorate Act was consistent with existing federal agricultural policy. Id. The same argument has been proposed by several commentators. See,
e.g., Jacobs, State Regulation and the FederalAntitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
221, 249 (1975); cf. Verkuil, supra note 27, at 343 n.77 (test based on concurrence of state
and federal policies fails to resolve conflict between federal interest in antitrust policy and
preservation of federalism).
"' See 435 U.S. at 418 (Marshall, J., concurring).
120 Compare Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 389 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("state policy" test
implies that only action which meets state policy goals without being overly broad will merit
exemption) with Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62 ("independent" state regulatory interest was the
important missing element in Cantor).
"2 435 U.S. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart believed that a standard
which grounded antitrust immunity on the nature of state economic regulation would require specific delegations of state power in order to sustain local governmental action in the
federal courts. Id.; accord Curtin, supra note 109, at 19-21. Additionally, Justice Stewart
contended that the vagueness of the Lafayette standard would discourage state experimentation with economic regulation. 435 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra note
114.
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mental relations. First, by noting that cities are not themselves
sovereign, and, therefore, not entitled to the same deference accorded states, the Court threatened to stifle experimentation at the
local level. Second, a plurality, and perhaps a majority, of the
Court fashioned a Parker test that invited "the sort of wide-ranging inquiry into the reasonableness of state regulations" that
the
1 22
Supreme Court had abandoned when it rejected Lochner.
Fox AND Midcal: A

CONSENSUS RETURNS TO THE COURT

Shortly after Lafayette, the state action exemption was extended in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 123 by a

relatively united Court.12 In Fox, the California Automobile
Franchise Act 125 required automobile manufacturers to secure the
approval of the California New Motor Vehicle Board before opening or transferring a dealership if existing dealers protested.1 2 Fox,
recently assigned by General Motors to operate a new franchise,
brought this action when the vehicle board, in response to the protests of threatened dealers, notified Fox that he could not open his
outlet pending hearings on whether there existed good cause for
not permitting the new dealership.1 27 It was contended that the
Act conflicted with antitrust principles "by delaying the establishment of automobile dealerships whenever competing dealers protest" thereby giving effect to restraints of trade. 128 Justice Brennan
122

435 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730

(1963); infra note 182. See generally Comment, supra note 30, at 140-41.
123 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
"I Justice Brennan wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, White, Marshall, and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, concurred in the result. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.
125 CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3062-3063 (West Supp. 1978).
6'Id. § 3062.
127 439 U.S. at 104. Under the California Vehicle Code, when a competing franchisee
files a notice of protest with the vehicle board concerning the establishment or relocation of
a dealership within a particular market area, the franchisor is not permitted to establish or
relocate the proposed dealership until the board has held a hearing pursuant to section 3066
of the California Vehicle Code or thereafter if the board has good cause for concluding that
the proposed dealership is impermissible. CAL. VEH. CODE § 3062(a) (West Supp. 1978).
Where several franchisees notify the vehicle board of their protest, hearings may be consolidated to facilitate resolution. Id.
28 439 U.S. at 109. Initially, Fox and General Motors contended that the statutory
scheme violated due process since it entitled "a protesting dealership to a summary administrative adjudication in the form of a notice having the effect of a temporary injunction
restraining ... General Motors' exercise of its right to franchise at will." Id. at 104. Disagreeing, the Fox majority held that "[tihe Board's notice has none of the attributes of an
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accorded the regulation state action exemption since the regulatory
scheme contained a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" intention to restrict unbridled business freedom in establishing and relocating automobile dealerships.1 2 9
Perhaps the greatest criticism of extending Parker'sprotection
to the Fox context arises from the private character of the parties
who may trigger the review procedure. Justice Stevens' dissent, although directed at the due process aspects of the case, l30 raised
this very issue when he complained that the statute gave private
individuals the ability to invoke states' power to limit the business
freedom of their competitors.13 ' Of crucial importance in Fox was
the fact that since the inception of the dealership location pro13 2
gram, 117 protests had been filed before the reviewing agency.
As in Bates, this reexamination indicated the state's awareness and
active supervision of the scheme.13 3 In such circumstances, where a
program was so clearly favored and scrutinized by a state, application of antitrust principles could place unwarranted strains on
state and local power. Accordingly, the Court held that
"[p]rotesting dealers who invoke in good faith their statutory right
to governmental action in the form of a Board determination that
a proposed dealership do not
there is good cause for not1 permitting
34
violate the Sherman Act.' 1
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
injunction," Ed., and could "hardly be characterized as an administrative order [since]
[ilssuance of the notice did not involve the exercise of discretion," id. at 105. According to
the majority, "[e]ven if the right to franchise . . . constituted a protected interest ....
California's Legislature was still constitutionally empowered to enact a general scheme of
business regulation that imposed reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of the right." Id.
at 106. Finally, notwithstanding that the board only delayed franchise establishment or relocation when existing franchisees elected to protest, id. at 109, the Court rejected the assertion that the scheme was an impermissible delegation of state power to private persons, id.
at 108-09. In the Court's opinion, "[a]n otherwise valid regulation is not rendered invalid
simply because those whom the regulation is designed to safeguard may elect to forego its
protection." Id. at 109.
129

Id.

Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Richards, supra note 5, at 553 n.95.
U.S. at 127 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart stated that the California
statute "blatantly offends the principles of fair notice, attention to the merits, and neutral
dispute resolution that inform the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
1-2 Id. at 110 n.14. In his dissent, Justice Stewart reasoned that since only one protest
of 117 filed was sustained, over 99% were found to be inconsistent with the policy of the
statute and that therefore there was no real evidence that California had a policy against
new dealerships. Id. at 120 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" See 7 J. VON KALINOwSKI, supra note 44, § 46.03[2], at 46-28.
131 439 U.S. at 110; see Sherman Antitrust Act Comment, supra note 1, at 155 & n.126.
110

131 439
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Inc. 5 provided the Court with an opportunity to reinforce the

Parker test employed in Fox. Midcal involved an antitrust challenge to a California regulation that required wine producers,
wholesalers and rectifiers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state. 13 Wholesalers were required to establish a resale price schedule and any licensee selling below the established
prices was subject to fines, license suspension or license revocation.137 Midcal Aluminum was charged with selling wine at prices
below those established in its price schedules and for selling wine
for which no fair trade contract or schedule had been filed.138 After

stipulating that the allegations were true, the company sought an
injunction against9 the wine pricing system based upon its anticompetitive nature.1

The Supreme Court scrutinized the scheme in order to determine whether the state's participation in the activity rose to the
level required by Parker.40 Justice Powell, speaking for a unanimous Court, examined the prior state action exemption cases, recalling that the Fox Court had extended the exemption to California's automobile dealer location program based upon: (1) the
state's "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" intention
to replace entrepreneurial liberty with regulation;' 4 ' and (2) the active supervisory role assumed by the state.

42

The Midcal Court

thus identified these two factors as prerequisites to receiving an
exemption under the Parker doctrine. Although the wine pricing
1.35445 U.S. 97 (1980).
136 Id. at 99. The California statute provided:

Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and rectifier
shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers for which his
resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by the person who owns
or controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale prices, if he
owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24,866 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
1
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 24,880 (West 1964) (repealed 1980).
1 445 U.S. at 100.
39 Id. Midcal Aluminum challenged California's fair trade posting laws, which regulated wholesale and retail sale of wine in the state. Id. The California Court of Appeals,
relying upon the California Supreme Court decision in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978), had already held that
California's wine pricing system violated the Sherman Act. 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 981, 153
Cal. Rptr. 757, 758 (Ct. App. 1979).
140 445 U.S. at 103.
1
Id. at 105 (quoting Fox, 439 U.S. at 109); see supra text accompanying note 128.
142 445 U.S. at 105.
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scheme met the first standard, the Court denied the program an
exemption based upon its failure to satisfy the second standard of
active state participation. 4 '
By confining its Parker analysis to procedural questions, such
as whether the state clearly articulated its regulatory policy and
whether it actively supervised the program, the Midcal Court appears to have removed the substantive due process element from
the state action inquiry.144 This is not entirely certain, however, as
a closer examination of the Midcal decision demonstrates. The
Court additionally noted that the wine pricing scheme was not
sheltered by the twenty-first amendment.' 45 The language of the
amendment and the federal interest in antitrust enforcement 46
compelled Justice Powell to impose antitrust liability on the CaliId. at 105-06. The Court determined that California had authorized the price-setting
and enforced the prices established by private parties, id., but had no further involvement
in the program, id. at 106. The Court held that the California regulations could not stand
because they permitted private parties to engage in price fixing in violation of the Sherman
Act. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated "[t]he national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price fixing arrangement." Id.; see Note, Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board: The Demise of Fair Trade in California,3 GLENDALE L. REV. 105,
115 (1978-1979).
144 See Sherman Antitrust Act Comment, supra note 1, at 159-60. Midcal's two-step
test for application of the state action exemption reflects the Bates test absent its second
factor, see supratext accompanying notes 76-80, and appears to sanction a more responsible
approach by reducing the potential threat that the Court will scrutinize the wisdom or desirability of state legislation. See text accompanying notes 86-87, 118-21. Every member of
the Court appeared to accept this restatement of the state action standard originally articulated by the Lafayette plurality. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
102 S. Ct. at 840, 841 n.14.
"I' 445 U.S. at 114. Section 2 of the twenty-first amendment states: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI, § 2. Section 1 of the amendment repealed the 18th amendment's
prohibition on the manufacture, sale, or transportation of liquor. Id. § 1.
Section 2 of the twenty-first amendment generally is considered a reservation of power
to the states. See 445 U.S. at 106; Note, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on
State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1579 (1975);
Note, Retail PriceMaintenancefor Liquor: Does the Twenty-First Amendment Preclude a
Free Trade Market? 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 507, 510 (1978). But see Norman's on the
Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1971) (section 2 of the twentyfirst amendment was not an affirmative grant of power to the states to enact legislation, but
merely "allows states to utilize their police powers with respect to liquor in ways which
might otherwise offend the Commerce Clause").
445 U.S. at 110-11. The Court reasoned that the Sherman Act is as important to
economic freedom as the Bill of Rights is to personal freedom, and stressed that Congress
had exercised its commerce clause power to its full extent when the Sherman Act was approved. Id. at 111; see Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
43
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fornia wine industry, 147 since the reasons proffered in support of
the state program were considered inconsequential.14 8 It would
seem to follow that when a state statute purports to regulate the
importation, sale or distribution of alcohol indirectly, as for example by price setting, the state will have to show a legitimate interest to overcome the federal commerce power.1 4 e Thus, it remains
doubtful that the Midcal Court effectively has abandoned the second Bates inquiry-the state's interest in regulation-in all
situations.
1'7 See 445 U.S. at 110. The California courts adopted the view that the state's interest
in regulating wine prices included the promotion of temperance and orderly market conditions, Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 76, and the
Supreme Court accepted that finding, 445 U.S. at 111-12.
148 445 U.S. at 114. The Court reasoned that the state interests of promoting temperance and creating orderly market conditions were simply unsubstantiated. Id. The Court
based this conclusion on a California study that indicated a 42% increase in per capita
liquor consumption in California during the years that resale price maintenance was in effect. Id. at 112.; see CALIFORNIA

DEPT. OF FINANCE, ALCOHOL AND THE STATE: A REAPPRAISAL
OF CALIFORNIA'S ALCOHOL PoLCmS xi, 15 (1974). At the very least, the Court asserted, the

study raised doubt as to whether the California laws would promote temperance. 445 U.S. at
112. Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that the laws promoted orderly market conditions, basing its conclusion on a congressional study that indicated that states with fair
trade had a higher rate of firm failures than did free trade states. Id. at 113 (citing S. Rep.
No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1569, 1571). Thus, in weighing the state's interest in promoting temperance and orderly
market conditions against the federal interest in promoting a competitive economy, the
Court concluded that "[t]he unsubstantiated state concerns ... simply are not of the same
stature as the goals of the Sherman Act." 445 U.S. at 114.
149 The Midcal Court observed that a state has "virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor." 445 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added). Prior
case law, however, has established that states are possessed of total control over the importation or sale of liquor. Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939);
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939); Mahoney v.
Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1938); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936); see Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 72 HAxv. L. REv. 1145, 1147
(1959). The Court's use of the word "virtually," however, instead of "complete" in referring
to a state's control over alcohol may refer only to restrictions placed on a state's power by
constitutional provisions other than the commerce clause. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 2 (prohibits any state from taxing imports or exports); see also Department of Revenue v.
James B. Bean Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 346 (1964) (states have no power to tax alcohol
imported from abroad under the 21st amendment). The Court's holding, then, may be restricted to employment of a balancing test between state regulation of alcohol and federal
commerce power when a state statute purports to exercise power over a peripheral aspect of
liquor regulation. See Comment, supra note 8, at 310-11. Under Midcal, courts will be required to scrutinize state statutes dealing with peripheral state regulation of alcohol in an
effort to determine whether the asserted state policies are effected by the state regulatory
statute. Id. at 311.
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Boulder:

RADICALLY ALTERING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
STATES AND THEIR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder 50 afforded the Supreme Court its most recent opportunity to explore
the state action exemption. Refining the issues adjudicated in Lafayette, the Boulder case looked to whether the state action exemption would clothe a "home rule" municipality with antitrust
immunity. 151
The dispute arose when the city of Boulder, organized as a
home rule municipality under the Colorado Constitution, 152 passed
a city ordinance that placed a 3-month moratorium on cable television expansion by the Community Communications Company
(CCC). 551 During the moratorium period the city council was to
180455 U.S. 40 (1982). Justice Brennan filed the opinion for the majority. A concurring
opinion was filed by Justice Stevens. Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion in
which the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor joined. Justice White took no part in the
decision of the case.
181 Id. at 43.
151 Id. The Colorado Constitution provides in part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand
inhabitants as determined by the last preceding census ... are hereby vested
with, and they shall always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the
charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and extend to all its
local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall
supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town
any law of the state in conflict therewith.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all
municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in
both local and municipal matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers
shall not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the people thereof,
any right or power essential or proper to the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to
apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of
such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. This provision is similar to those adopted by many other states
throughout the country. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. VII, §§ 22, 34.
Colorado's home rule amendment is particularly broad, however, in that it allows the municipal law, in effect, to preempt state law when the two conflict. Driker & Share, Community
Communications v. Boulder-New Problems for Municipalities, 61 MICH. B.J. 426, 429
(1982).
153 455 U.S. at 45-46. CCC was operating a cable franchise in Boulder under a nonexclusive permit granted by the city council in 1964 and extending for a 20-year period. Id. at 44.
This permit granted CCC the right to conduct business within the Boulder city limits. Id. In
May of 1979, CCC informed the council of its intentions to expand. Id. at 45. In July of
1979, Boulder Communications Company advised the council of its intention to enter into
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draft a model cable television ordinance and solicit new businesses
to enter the market in compliance with the ordinance."' CCC
sought an injunction to prevent the city from imposing the moratorium, alleging that enforcement of the ordinance would violate the
Sherman Act. 15 5 In response, the city156claimed that the ordinance
was shielded by the Parker doctrine.

The district court focused upon the city's status as a home
rule municipality and concluded that the Parker exemption was
"wholly inapplicable.

1 57

It grounded this denial of an antitrust

shield partly upon the fact that home rule status gave the city autonomy solely over matters of local concern, while cable television
embraced not only the more expansive concern of interstate commerce but also the first amendment rights of free speech.158
Rejecting this conclusion, a divided court of appeals reversed,
extending the Parker exemption to the city.1 59 The court of ap-

peals characterized the cable franchise as a distinctly local concern,
and noted that home rule cities in Colorado had absolute authority
to regulate local matters.1 60 Thus the court of appeals granted the
direct competition with CCC in providing cable services. Id. The city responded with its
"emergency" moratorium. Id. at 45-46.
154 Id. at 46. The city council defended its moratorium period by contending that time
was needed for solicitation and evaluation of applications from other interested companies.
Id. at 46 n.7. The council believed that the 3-month advantage would discourage the potential competitors from locating in Boulder. Id. at 46. The Boulder Communications Company, however, had already expressed an interest in entering the market despite any action
the city would take with respect to CCC. Id. at 45 & n.5, 46 & n.8.
1 Id. at 46-47. The petitioner also complained of a conspiracy to replace services provided by their corporation with those provided by the Boulder Communications Company.
The district court found insufficient evidence by which CCC could obtain a judgment on
this claim. Id. at 47 n.9.
,'lId. at 47. The municipality contended that the state action exemption enunciated in
the Parkerdecision protected it against any antitrust claims arising from imposition of the
moratorium against CCC. Id. It further contended that the 3-month prohibition on expansion was a valid exercise of the police powers reserved to the city. Id.
157Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D.
Colo. 1980).
'18See id. at 1038-39. The district court recognized the city of Boulder's authority to
regulate matters of local concern without interference by state government, but noted that
"[tihere is no Colorado case which characterizes the operations of cable television companies
as a matter of local concern." Id. at 1038.
,59Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir.
1980).
110 Id. at 707. The court of appeals directed its attention to the franchise rather than
the industry as a whole in determining the ambit of the local concern. Id. The majority
viewed the cable services as necessarily restricted to the Boulder city limits by the terms of
the franchise. Id. The court concluded, "[tihe matter or subject is a local one." Id.
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state action exemption to the home rule city limiting the applicability of Lafayette to an exercise of governmental, as opposed to
proprietary control. 161
The Supreme Court, by a five-to-three margin, denied the city
an exemption from the antitrust laws.1 62 Justice Brennan, author
of the Court's opinion, declined to equate the activity of a municipality with that of a state, asserting that an exemption must pay
homage only to the federalist principles of state sovereignty. 6 3 The
majority accepted as controlling Parker's characterization of our
governmental system as one of state and federal authority "which
has no place for sovereign cities."'" Striking a blow to the country's home rule movement,16 5 Justice Brennan observed that "'we
are a nation not of "city-states" but of States.' ""6 Accordingly,
since municipalities did not share the sovereignty of states, the city
67
of Boulder would not qualify for an exemption.
Boulder argued, however, that its ordinance was entitled to an
exemption as an express implementation of state- policy.6 s It
claimed that the home rule statute's deference to local autonomy
created an inference that Boulder's anticompetitive ordinance was
squarely within the contemplation of the state. 6 9 In rejecting this
argument, the majority stressed that "the requirement of 'clear ar"I Id.; see Parker Doctrine Comment, supra note 1, at 532.

162455 U.S. at 56.

1"'Id. at 53-54. Since cities are not the equivalent of states with respect to sovereignty,
Justice Brennan reasoned, the exemption should not be extended. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974) (county not equivalent of state for eleventh amendment purposes). This reasoning was encouraged by Lafayette, in which the Court determined that
the antitrust laws should be extended to local governments to ensure against local government making "economic choices counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to anticompetitive effects." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408.
16 455 U.S. at 53; see supra text accompanying note 28.
165 See 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist complained that
the Boulder decision "effectively destroys the 'home rule' movement in this country,
through which local governments have obtained, not without persistent state opposition, a
limited autonomy over matters of local concern." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 54 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at
717 (Markey, C.J., dissenting)).
167455 U.S. at 52. The Court concluded that under Lafayette's standard, the City of
Boulder was not exempt from liability without a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." Id.

166 Id. at 52-53.

169 Id. at 54-55. Boulder claimed that the Colorado Home Rule Amendment was intended by the state to grant the council the authority to enact the type of regulation represented by the ordinance. Id. Therefore, the requisite state articulation and expression were
present in the amendment's delegation of state power. Id.
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ticulation and affirmative expression' is not satisfied when the
State's position is one of neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive.' 70
The Court perceived no justification for extending an antitrust
shield but was not wholly unmindful of the possible adverse consequences its decision would have upon cities. 17 1 Clearly, however,
the majority was not seriously troubled by this contingency. First,
the Court minimized the issue of fashioning a remedy, asserting
that it was not necessary, at the time, to confront such a problem.1 72 Second, the complaint against municipal liability was

viewed as "simply an attack upon the wisdom of the long-standing
congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and open
competition embodied in the antitrust laws."' 73 Finally, the majority stressed that its decision would not foreclose the allocation of
power between the states and their political subdivisions. 1 4 The
Court disbelieved that the Boulder decision would threaten the effectiveness of local government, and emphasized a municipality's
freedom to engage in anticompetitive activity so long as it was au5
7
thorized by the state.

Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor, authored a dissent that challenged the majority's basic
perception of the Parker doctrine.'7 First, the dissent argued that
the doctrine, rather than raising exemption questions, actually
"IId. at 55. The Court concluded that the state had not expressed the desire to grant
Boulder the power to promulgate anticompetitive regulations, since the amendment did not
identify the powers granted with sufficient precision to satisfy the elements of the Lafayette
test. Id. The state in effect gave the municipalities a free hand in government, but its lack of
direct comment on the issue rendered its stance one of neutrality. Id.
7 Id. In the Court's view, "[a]cceptance of . . . [the] proposition-that the general
grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific
anti-competitive ordinances-would wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and
affirmative expression' that [the] precedents require." Id.; see infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
172 455 U.S. at 56-57 n.20.
178 Id. at 56. Section 1 of the Sherman Act disallows unreasonable restraints of trade.
See supra note 2. The Supreme Court has recognized that the only guideline which effectively may be used to interpret the reasonableness of a trade restraint is to weigh its anticompetitive effects against its beneficial effects. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
174 455 U.S. at 57.
175 Id. Quoting Lafayette, the Court stated: "'[A]ssuming that the municipality is authorized to provide service on a monopoly basis, these limitations on municipal action will
not hobble the execution of legitimate governmental programs."' Id. (quoting Lafayette,
435 U.S. at 417).
176 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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presented a preemption problem. 7 7 Second, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's treatment of municipal entities as being
indistinguishable from private business for antitrust purposes. 7 8
Justice Rehnquist calculated that the combined effect of these two
serious flaws would have a substantial adverse effect on local gov17
ernments' ability to marshal their police powers.
The dissent expressed an additional fear that municipalities
would be precluded from experimenting with innovative social programs. s0 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist believed that if the rule of
reason analysis 18 1 were modified to permit cities to defend their
7 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the constitutional supremacy of the laws of the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law is said to preempt state law when there is a direct conflict between the two, or when
the state legislates in an area that the federal government has displayed an intention to
occupy wholly. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrtUMONAL LAW 376-79, 384 (1978). Under an exemption analysis, the task of the judiciary is initially to look for an express statutory exemption. In the absence of an express exemption, the Court then will decide whether an implied
exemption is warranted. With respect to the antitrust laws, the Court has not been favorably disposed to finding implied exemptions. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341, 357 (1963). Express statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws include the Capper-Volstead Act's exemption of agricultural cooperatives, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976), and the
Webb-Pomerene Act's statutory exemption of certain agreements made by trade associations, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976). An example of a judicially created exemption is that recognized
in favor of professional baseball. See Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S.
200, 208-09 (1922). Although the baseball exclusion originally was based upon the notion
that professional baseball did not sufficiently implicate interstate commerce, id., the Court
reaffirmed the exclusion on the basis of legislative inaction, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282
(1972).
While exemption analysis has long been utilized by the judiciary in the antitrust context, preemption analysis is usually employed with respect to the commerce clause. L.
TRIBE, supra, at 390. As early as 1978, Professor Handler suggested that preemption analysis was well suited to the state action question. See Handler, supra note 34, at 1378. It has
been argued that the application of a preemption analysis to the state action question would
provide the analytical framework that was found lacking in earlier Supreme Court state
action cases. Id.
When a preemption analysis is utilized, there is a greater possibility that the action of
the state will be upheld since there is a presumption in favor of the state law from the
outset. Id. at 1380. It currently appears that the Court is moving toward the preemption
approach advocated by the dissenters in Boulder. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102 S.
Ct. 3294, 3299 (1982). In Rice, the Court applied a preemption analysis to a state statute
challenged as violative of the Sherman Act. Id. The Court stated that resolution of the
preemption issue rendered consideration of the Parker question unnecessary. Id. at 3301
n.9.
178 455 U.S. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

I" Id. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
181 The rule of reason analysis first set forth by Chief Justice Edward D. White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911), served to place a judicial gloss over the
Sherman Act's blunt proscriptions against "every contract, combination ... or conspiracy
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anticompetitive regulations, judicial review would come to resem-

ble that of the Lochner era." 2 Opposing such a broadly conceived
investigation of local regulation, Justice Rehnquist was wary of a
Parker approach which would permit federal courts to impose
their own sociological and economic ideology upon state legislative
bodies."" Since the dissenters believed that a preemption analysis
should guide the Court, they saw no reason to use a different test
to examine municipal ordinances than the standards applied to
state statutes.8 4 Thus, in disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that federalism remains unaffected when the Sherman Act is
in restraint of trade." See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added). In contrast to the rule of
reason approach, the per se approach to illegality condemns certain practices that are so
clearly pernicious as to be declared violative of the antitrust laws without an inquiry as to
possible justifications. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)
(territorial division of markets); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940) (price fixing). While the application of a per se analysis is fairly mechanical, Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), a rule of reason analysis necessarily
involves an uncertain case-by-case adjudication, see 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 44, §
2.03[1]. The analysis requires the factfinder to consider the particular facts of the case as
well as the intricacies of the business in which the case arose. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
182 455 U.S. at 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), the Court struck down a New York statute prohibiting more than 60 hours of work
per week. Id. at 64. The Lochner Court determined that the statute interfered with the right
of contract between employer and employee. Id. During the Lochner era, the Court continually reviewed and invalidated social and economic legislation based upon a failure to show a
clear nexus between the challenged legislative scheme and its purported objectives. L.
TRIBE, supra note 177, at 438. The Court's abandonment of the Lochner rationale was characterized by a sustaining of regulatory measures on the barest of facts supporting the legislative judgment. Id. at 450.
183 455 U.S. at 67-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It has been suggested that during the
Lochner era, the Court was influenced by a laissez-faire economic outlook. L. TRIBE, supra
note 177, at 435. Arguably, the danger of having politico-economic ideology influence judicial decisionmaking is inherent in the rule of reason approach which necessarily requires a
case-by-case adjudication. See 1 J. vON KALINOWSKI, supra note 44, § 2.03[1]. Interestingly,
an argument that liberty of contract and property rights would be impaired by the Court's
application of the Sherman Act was rejected at an early date. See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911).
18 455 U.S. at 68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Under preemption analysis the Court does
not distinguish between state statutes and city ordinances. Id. Generally, any restriction in
the federal Constitution will limit municipalities in the same way that states are limited
given the fact that cities are merely creatures of the state legislature. 5 E. McQUILLIN, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS § 19.02 (3d rev. ed. 1979). Justice Rehnquist's bold assertion that the
state action analysis always has been characterized by a preemption analysis, then, is difficult to square with Lafayette's focus on the inherent differences between cities and states,
435 U.S. at 412, and Goldfarb's unequivocal emphasis on an exemption approach, see 421
U.S. at 787. In denying Parker immunity in Goldfarb, the Court construed the state action
question as falling within a long line of exemption cases, noting that these "cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption against implied exemptions." Id.
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used to strike down a municipal ordinance, i"5 the dissenters called
for analysis whereby a uniform standard would be applied to both
state and municipal regulation.186 Accordingly, the dissenting Justices believed that the majority's distinction between municipalities and states became chimerical when the proper method of analysis was applied.87
Lamenting the decision, Justice Rehnquist described it as one
which "radically alter[s] the relationship between the States and
their political subdivisions" and signaled the end of the home rule
movement in the United States. 8 Greatly concerned about the ad,85See 455 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The charge of the dissent that federalism is implicated when the Sherman Act is used to strike down a municipal ordinance may
be somewhat overstated, since the majority characterized the exemption analysis as founded
upon principles of federalism. See id. at 50. According to the majority, the federal system of
government recognizes only two sovereigns, state and federal, and, therefore, there was no
finding of Parker immunity for cities. Id. The majority's conception of federalism in the
Boulder case has been criticized as allowing an inordinate amount of federal interference
with state matters. Freilich & Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Return to
the Dark Ages before Home Rule, 14 URB. LAw x (1982). It has been suggested that true
concepts of federalism would require the Court to defer to the state's delegation of power to
the home rule municipality. Id. at xi-xii.
188 455 U.S. at 70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A home rule municipality is unique in that ordinary
municipal corporations have no inherent right of self-government due to the fact that cities
are creatures of the state legislature. The right to home rule must come from the state
constitution (in which case it is conferred by the people) or the state legislature. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 184, § 4.82. Traditionally, the construction of the powers of a home rule
municipality were limited by the application of "Dillon's Rule." See City of Evanston v.
Create, Inc., 85 IM. 2d 101, 104, 421 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1981). According to Dillon's Rule, any
doubts as to whether power lies in the municipal corporation or the state were resolved in
favor of the state. 1 J. DMLON, COMMENTARmES ON THE LAW OP MuNmciAL CORPOATIONS §
237(89) (5th rev. ed. 1911). The modem home rule movement, on the other hand, has witnessed a gravitation away from the strict application of Dillon's Rule and toward expanding
the powers of the municipality. J. HARRGAN, POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METMOPOLIS 146
(1976); see City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 85 IlM. 2d 101, 104, 421 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1981).
In deciding whether the power in question lies with the city or state government, state
courts have utilized a preemption analysis analogous to the approach taken when deciding
whether a federal statute will preempt state legislation. See, e.g., City of Evanston v. Create,
Inc., 85 IMI.2d 101, 107, 421 N.E.2d 196, 201 (1981); City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227
Kan. 332, 336, 607 P.2d 459, 464 (1980). In addition to declaring that the powers of home
rule jurisdictions be liberally construed, the Illinois home rule statute expressly includes the
preemption approach. See ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 6(i), (m). The broad powers granted municipalities under this approach are clear, since it has been argued that in order for a state
statute to preempt a city ordinance, the statute specifically must mention the legislature's
intent to wholly occupy the field. Comment, A Balancing Analysis: The Construction of
Illinois Home Rule Powers-County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 11 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 543, 552-53 (1980).
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verse impact on the future of our system of federalism, Justice
Rehnquist closed his dissent with a stinging rebuke: "It is nothing
less than a novel and egregious error when this Court uses the
Sherman Act to regulate the relationship between the States and
their political subdivisions. 'l' 89
There was no dispute among the Justices over the great degree
of autonomy with which the city of Boulder, as a home rule city,
was vested. Instead, the Boulder split arose over the determination
of whether Parker was intended to dilute federal antitrust policy
for the benefit of all governmental units or whether it was narrowly
designed to balance the interests of the national government and
the state governments, thus preserving a federal system. The Boulder majority's choice of the narrower reading of Parker apparently
is consistent with the weight of authority.1 9 0 The Lafayette plurality unequivocally determined that cities were not entitled to the
same deference accorded states since cities are not sovereign.9
Moreover, such an approach comports with the historical view that
municipalities lack the constitutional foundation of the states.9 2
While the Boulder decision may interfere with the flexibility of
189 455
190 See

U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting an implied exclusion for cities based on their status); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1976) (noting that the limiting language used by
Justice Stone in Parker required an express legislative command to displace the antitrust
laws); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1973) (requiring a specific state
authorization of attorney's minimum fee schedules in order to receive Parkerprotection). In
addition to state action cases, support for a narrow reading of Parkercan be found in cases
adjudicating claims of implied exemption from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963). Additionally, the Court has given a
narrow reading to express statutory exemptions. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1966) (Shipping Act's exemption from antitrust
laws limited to specific statutory language); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939) (agricultural cooperative exemption given a narrow construction). The broad construction these cases have afforded the Sherman Act is consistent with the broad statutory
language of the antitrust laws. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533, 553 (1944); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTTRUST 13-14 (1977); cf.
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972) (noting the broad powers of
the Federal Trade Commission in enforcing the antitrust laws).
191 See 435 U.S. at 408.
"' The powers of the state are defined as those that have not been delegated by the
people to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The powers of a municipal
corporation, on the other hand, are granted exclusively by the state. 1 E. McQuILLIN, supra
note 184, § 3.02(b), at 208. The people do not possess the power to form a municipal corporation independent of the action of the state legislature. Id. While the powers of most municipalities then, are necessarily limited to those granted by the state legislature, the powers
of a home rule municipality are fairly broad. See supra note 188.
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city government, 1 93 it is certainly an overstatement to speak of the
destruction of local governance as a necessary result of Boulder.
Although the Court has not acknowledged the right of municipalities to a separate exemption,""' the Boulder Court reaffirmed the
notion first set forth in Lafayette, that the anticompetitive acts of
cities are protected when imposed pursuant to a clearly
articulated
5
state policy to replace competition with regulation.11
A look at some post-Boulder decisions reveals that the Court's
failure to accord the home rule municipality any special significance has not had the crippling effect envisioned by Justice Rehnquist's dissent. A narrow reading of Boulder has allowed courts to
hold that while a home rule provision standing alone will not afford a blanket immunity from the antitrust laws, a broad statutory
mandate will suffice. Additionally, a willingness to distinguish between public and private defendants has allowed a broader range
of Parker immunity for the public defendant.
For example, in Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas
City,196 the court upheld specific anticompetitive actions of a municipality on the basis of general statutory authority. 1 97 Although
193 Freilich & Carlisle, supra note 185, at v, vi; Hoskins, The "Boulder Revolution" in

Municipal Antitrust Law, 70 ILL. B.J. 684, 684 (1982). Commentators most often take issue
with Boulder's strict requirements that the state must have "specifically authorized the very
action or conduct which is challenged as anticompetitive." See, e.g., id. at 684 (emphasis in
original). It has been recognized that meeting this requirement will be difficult in the case of
home rule municipalities due to the fact that state legislatures are often silent on the question of whether a particular area of the law is to be subject to state preemption. See Areeda,
supra note 85, at 448-49; Driker & Share, supra note 152, at 430.
19 See supra text accompanying note 191.
'9 455 U.S. at 54-55. It was argued that a blanket immunity would greatly weaken
Parker'sproscriptions against merely "authorizing" antitrust violations. While it is true that
under the Boulder formulation, a municipality is not entirely deprived of Parker'sprotection, it is equally true that Boulder may be construed as affording no greater deference to a
municipality than that currently afforded any private party. Such a construction of Parker
was not foreclosed prior to Boulder as is demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit's approach in
United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979). In
Texas Board, the court noted that "a political subdivision would not be required to point to
a 'specific, detailed legislative authorization' before it may properly assert a defense of immunity." Id. at 920 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415).
199538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
197 Id. at 964. In Gold Cross, the City of Kansas City established an emergency ambulance service that allowed for only one ambulance company to operate within the city limits.
Id. at 960. Gold Cross alleged that the actions of the city were violative of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 960-61. In allowing the municipality the claim of Parkerimmunity, the
court pointed to a Missouri statute that authorized "any county, city, town or village to
provide a general ambulance service." Id. at 964. It is important to note that the statute in
question did not specifically authorize the city to set up one and only one ambulance ser-
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the state statute in question did not specify the activity complained of, a reading of Lafayette in conjunction with a narrow
reading of Boulder lead the court to sustain the city's activities. 19 8
In addition, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Southern Motor
CarriersRate Conference, Inc.,19 9 indicated the importance of distinguishing between public and private defendants, noting that the
burden of public defendants satisfying Midcal's requirements
should be lighter. 20 0 Further evidence of a willingness on the part
of the judiciary to distinguish between public and private defendants is found in Gold Cross' emphasis on the motivations of the
municipality 20 1 as well as the expression of doubt as to the propriety of the imposition of monetary damages on municipal defendants. °2 Finally, the Supreme Court itself recently has reaffirmed
the principle that states have "extraordinarily wide latitude" in
the management of their internal affairs and in the creation and
management of political subdivisions.20 3
While these interpretations of Boulder may not solve entirely
the home rule municipality's dilemma of satisfying the Midcal requirements,0 4 it is clear that Boulder has not foreclosed totally a
city's ability to regulate in an anticompetitive manner. Unfettered
municipal authority by way of a grant of blanket immunity, on the
other hand, would have had the ultimate effect of undermining
Parker'sfocus on preserving the integrity of the states in our federal system, 20 5 and weakening the Court's proscription against
vice, but rather, contemplated that the city regulate ambulance service in a general sense.
Id.
1

Id. at 965.

19 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982).

o 672 F.2d at 473. The court emphasized that the "analysis differs substantially depending on whether the defendant is a public or private official or institution." Id.
201 Gold Cross Ambulance Co. v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 965 (W.D. Mo.
1982).

Id. at 969 n.10.
M Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187, 3206 (1982). It is interest-

ing that, in a footnote, the Seattle School District Court cited Boulder as support for the
proposition that states have a great deal of leeway in the management of their internal
affairs. Id. at 3207 n.7.
IN There remains the pressing problem of how to satisfy the Midcal test in the total
absence of state legislation; the initial problem of home rule municipalities in state action
questions. See supra note 193. This problem is at least partially ameliorated by utilizing the
approach of the courts in Gold Cross and Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference. See

supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
20I

See 317 U.S. at 351.
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merely "authorizing" antitrust violations. 0 6 Perhaps the major
criticism of granting identical immunity to cities and states is that
municipal government, in extending its services, is not always responsive to the users of its services.2 0 7 In Lafayette, Justice Brennan recognized that consumers utilizing the municipal services, but
living outside of the city, were unable to exert any meaningful political influence.2 08 Assuming, "as Lafayette suggests, [that] the antitrust laws were intended to limit the activities of accumulations
of power unresponsive to the people, 2 09 it is not unreasonable to

demand that the cities obtain at least an articulation of regulatory

policy from the states as a prerequisite to Parker's protection.210
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Boulder placed in perspective
the dissent's "dire predictions" of the calamitous consequences
that would accompany the majority's failure to follow preemption
analysis, reminding Justice Rehnquist that "the violation issue is
separate and distinct from the exemption issue." 211 Comparing
20e Id. at 352.
207 See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406-08 (1978).
In Lafayette, the Court noted that in 1972, there were 62,437 different units of local government in the United States. Id. at 407. In addition to the fact that specialized concerns of
municipalities may infringe on the rights of others, see id., it is equally true that application
of a blanket immunity to such a large number of governmental units would prove unworkable. This is especially so in light of the modem construction of home rule statutes which
allow municipalities to legislate on matters whose impact will be felt beyond its borders. See
City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227 Kan. 332, 336, 607 P.2d 459, 464 (1980) (stating that
"limiting home rule power to 'purely' local matters ...would totally emasculate home rule
power") (quoting Clark, State Control of Local Government in Kansas: Special Legislations and Home Rule, 20 KAN.L. REv. 631, 666 (1972)).

208 435 U.S. at 406.

209Richards & Krider, The State's Assault on Oil: Special Interests v. Consumer Welfare, 18 Am.Bus. L. J. 477, 502 (1981); cf. R. BORK, THE ANTrTRUST PARAnox 51 (1978) (the
only "legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare").
210 This accountability rationale behind the Boulder majority's interpretation of Parker
is consistent with the underlying assumption that federalism "is a form of government for
the people by the people. That is to say it is inherently democratic... ." U. HicKs, supra
note 9, at 4. Of course, one could also argue that many, if not most, of the anticompetitive
programs implemented by the states also impact upon those without an effective voice in
state government. This, however, merely supports the Court's narrow construction of the
state action exemption recognizing that the Parkerdoctrine is an accommodation of state
sovereignty and the expanding reach of the Sherman Act. See supra text accompanying
note 1.
21 455 U.S. at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' comment distinguishing the
exemption and preemption issues is important in that the Court has refrained from ruling
on the question of the damage liability of municipalities. See 455 U.S. at 56-57 & n.20.
Although cities traditionally have been subject to full liability for tortious acts, see Comment, Strict Liability Under Section 1983 for Municipal Deprivations of FederalRights?:
Owen v. City of Independence, 55 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 153, 159 (1980), the cogency of the
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Boulder with Lafayette, Justice Stevens found the Lafayette plurality opinion persuasive authority for denying an exemption to
the City of Boulder.2 1 2 Moreover, drawing from his plurality opinion in Cantor,Justice Stevens stressed that members of the Michigan Public Utility Commission who had authorized the program
under attack would not become parties to a violation of the Sher-

man Act.213
The Boulder dissent's complaint that the decision would allow
the courts to review the reasonableness of state legislation can be
countered in two ways. First, under the commerce clause the
states' justifications for their laws are already subject to judicial
evaluation. 1 4 Second, in suggesting that cities receive the same
Parker immunity as states, the dissent overlooked the fact that in
a federal system an accommodation must be made between state
and national interests.11 Thus, Boulder's narrow application of the
imposition of treble damages, such as those pursuant to antitrust liability, has been questioned with respect to municipal defendants, see P. AREEDA, ANrITRUsT LAW 48 (Supp.
1982). It has been argued that Congress never intended to impose liability on public officials. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 56, 1 217a(1), at 102. In the case of civil rights
violations, however, the imposition of damage liability on public officials has been held to be
entirely proper. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
Several factors distinguish the public antitrust defendant from the public civil rights
defendant. For example, the Court has found that section 1983 had the specific purpose of
curbing the acts of state officials. Id. at 651. The antitrust laws, on the other hand, did not
intend to displace the acts of public officials. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51
(1943). Additionally, the damages paid to a plaintiff in a civil rights action may be the only
source of recovery for the plaintiff. The availability of alternative remedial action and the
fact that there are often other grounds upon which to invalidate alleged antitrust violations
militates against an imposition of damage liability. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
56, at 103.
212 455 U.S. at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
21I Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 58592. It is not unlikely that in cases where a municipality is acting pursuant to a state's policy
favoring regulation over competition, the Court will adjudge the city under Cantor'sfairness
test. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978). In Raymond Motor Transportation,the Court held that the challenged state statute violated the
commerce clause because of a substantial burden on interstate commerce that was not outweighed by legitimate state interests. Id. The Court has also invalidated city ordinances on
commerce clause grounds. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356
(1951). Since a prerequisite to Sherman Act jurisdiction is that commerce "among the several states" be affected, it is likely that acts of states invalidated under the Sherman Act
may be equally subject to commerce clause attack. It has been suggested that rather than
resorting to invalidation of state laws under the antitrust statutes, a court can strike down
state action under any one of several constitutional provisions including the first and fourteenth amendments. See Areeda, supra note 85, at 454-55.
25 See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412.

1983]

STATE ACTION EXEMPTION

Parker doctrine can be explained as a means of preventing "exemptions from an important federal law for reasons wholly unrelated either to federal policy or even to any necessary significant
state interest.""" The majority's adherence to Midcal's requirement that the state clearly articulate an anticompetitive policy and
actively supervise the program appears to embody a procedural approach that will minimize the discretion of the judiciary in its review of state legislation, while ensuring a proper balance between
the authority of the states and the national government in our federal system.
CONCLUSION

Throughout the 40 years since the creation of the Parker doctrine, the Supreme Court has been criticized for its treatment of
the state action exemption. Professor Handler, writing in the wake
of Lafayette, lamented the Court's "failure to provide an analytical
framework by which the disposition of future state action cases2 17can
It
be predicted with at least a reasonable degree of certainty.
appears, however, that in recent years, the Court has done much to
eliminate the confusion surrounding the state action exemption, although, concededly, some uncertainty remains. Perhaps the clearest Parker situation is the instance where the anticompetitive activity stems from the actions of a state or one of its regulatory
agencies. In these cases the Court unanimously has adopted a twopronged test determining the appropriateness of Parker's protection:21 8 a clear articulation of anticompetitive policy and active
state supervision of the program. This two-step test safeguards
against the dilution of the national interest in antitrust unless the
challenged activity is, as a sovereign function of the state, vital to
its separate existence. While thus preserving our federal system,
such an approach is primarily procedural, thereby minimizing the
possibility of unrestrained judicial forays into the substantive decisionmaking process of the states.
When the antitrust defendant is a private party the appropriate Parker inquiry is not quite as clear. Cantor indicated that at a
minimum there must be some element of state compulsion in order
to trigger an exemption. Therefore, the more freedom of choice ex216

Cantor,428 U.S. at 603.

217 Handler, supra note 34, at 1378.

218 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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ercised by the private defendant in implementing the anticompetitive scheme, the less likely it is to receive Parker's protection.2 1
One might also expect that, at least where the private party lobbied for the anticompetitive mandate, the two-step test would also
be applied. Thus, a private entity, despite receiving an anticompetitive mandate, would not qualify for an exemption unless the state
itself could pass the two-pronged standard of Midcal. Notwithstanding objections that this would chill lobbying efforts,220 such
an approach actually may increase the flow of information to regulatory bodies. 221 The private lobbyist, seeking to ensure that the
state meets the "clear articulation" standard, would certainly solicit adequate review by the state of all aspects of the anticompetitive proposal. Perhaps this would eliminate numerous regulatory
schemes wholly unrelated to the welfare of the state. If so, it would
facilitate the accommodation between the national policy favoring
competition and the legitimate regulatory interests of the states.
Finally, when the antitrust violation is committed by a municipality, the judicial standards for receiving Parker'sexemption are
still somewhat beclouded. After Lafayette and Boulder it is certain
that a city, whether its activities are proprietary or governmental,
will not be eligible automatically for an exemption. Both decisions
require that there be a clear articulation of anticompetitive policy
by the state. It is unclear, however, whether active supervision by
some state entity other than the city is requisite or whether the
state actually must compel rather than authorize the restraint. In
any event, the post-Boulder cases clearly demonstrate that the
Midcal test adopted by the Boulder Court does not present an absolute barrier to the expansion of municipal authority.
As the Court made clear in Parker,the federal system is composed of dual sovereigns-the national government and the
states.2 2 2 To speak of a return to unqualified local autonomy at a
time when global complexities and interrelationships require
greater harmony is to retreat to the past. It appears that with
Boulder, the Supreme Court has arrived at an interpretation of the
Parker doctrine that allows it to coordinate the functions of dual
sovereigns while minimizing its input into the substance of legislative decisions.
219 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
221
222

See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 28.

